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ARGUMENT
Point h This Court should give effect to the plain language of the escape statute and
to the legislative intent for repealing the absconding statute.
The State attempts to torture the escape statute by reading into it words and intent
that are just not there. The state legislature specifically acted to take escapefromparole
out of the hands of the county prosecutors and place it under the Board of Pardons and
Parole.
Point 2. Mr. Richardson was denied due process of law when he was not bound
over nor arraigned,
Utah Constitution Article I section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of
Life, liberty or property without due process of law."
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 51 P.2d 645 Utah 1935 reads in part:
,M Due process of law requires that notice be given to the persons whose rights are
to be affected. It "hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment
only after trial/1 It is difficult to believe that the Legislature intended to empower the court
tofind"that the material allegations of the petition or complaint are true" without giving
the defendant an opportunity to be heard. It is elementary that a court may not make
findings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard. An act
which authorized a court to makefindingsbinding upon a defendant without giving him an
opportunity to be heard must fail
Affirmatively cited for this proposition in, Pangea Technologies. Inc. v. Internet
Promotions, Inc. 2004 WL 1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004.

REPLY TO THE STATES ARGUMENT REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF
ESCAPE

The state legislature has specifically addressed the issue presented. The Appellee
asserts that the legislature could not have meant to exclude parolee'sfromthe escape
statute, despite the plain language of the statute. Appellee says "Moreover, reading the
parole exception to modify only the fourth situation is the only reading that avoids the
'absurd result or [a result that] is 'unreasonable confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of a statute.'" quoting Savage, 2004 UT102 "
(Appellee's brief at page 15.)
The entirety of that quote from the Savage case reads:
"2A Sutherland Statutory Constr. § 46:1 (6th ed.2004). An equally well-settled caveat to
the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute
if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is "unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in
blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining
Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290. 1292 (Utah 1996). Above all, "[t]his courts primary objective in
construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent." Gohlerv. Wood. 919
R2d 561. 562 (Utah 1996)."
The Savage case involved the tort of negligent placement of a foster child.
As it turns out the legislature specifically meant to exclude parolee'sfromthe
escape statute as is clearly set forth. In fact the legislature had created a wholly new
escape statute for persons under probation or parole status, that crime was called
absconding. (Utah code section 76-8-309.5 [2000] repealed 2004),
That section was specifically repealed by Senate bill 0158 in the 2004 general session of
the legislature. The oral presentation by the bill's sponsor Senator Bell clearly sets forth
the intent of the legislature to not add an offense to persons who either escaped or
abscondedfromparole.
A transcript of the passage of the bill follows:

X

"Senate Bill 158 criminal offense amendments Senator BelT
"Thank you Mr. President Pro Tern
Ah this is an interesting little bill that may be of interesting only to defendants and criminal
defense attorneys. But, a few years ago the criminal justice community approached the
legislature and said that they wanted to strengthen the offense of absconding because they
felt like that would dissuade criminalsfromescaping custody and this would be an
additional felony in most cases. Well what has happened is that it's has dissuaded no one.
And the actual defendants instead of being handled through the probation and parole
system now have to come back for a whole new offense. We Feel like it is doubling up on
beds in the sense that were adding charge on charge and a so hat in hand with the same
community that advocated for this bill a few years ago came back and said it's not
working we need to a to a liberalize this law so that People who escape will be handled for
in most cases will be handled through the probation and parole system. And so, with that I
would be open for questions/'
Opened for questions.
Senator Bell moved for the third reading
Roll call vote passed 23 aye votes no nay votes
As can clearly be seen the purpose and intent of Senator Bell who sponsored senate bill
0158 was to do away with absconding so that parolees who left supervision, escaped were
not charged with additional offenses and were not subject to additional sanctions, except
under the auspices of the probation and parole system. (Floor and committee debates on
bills are not transcribed, therefore one must listen to thefloordebate on the legislatures
web site at "le.Utah.gov." per the Legislative Webmaster please see exhibit A).
It is the Appellee who wishes an absurd interpretation of the clear language of the
escape statute. Appellee suggests in his brief (page 12) that any person on parole status
that commits a new offense for which he is arrested, who subsequently escapes, could not
be charged with escape. That is an absurd reading, because the person is not on parole for
the new offense, he is in official custody for that offense so of course the escape statute
would apply. (Exhibit B is a copy of Senate Bill 158).

MR. RICHARDSON'S STATUS AS A PAROLEE NEVER CHANGED
The interchangefromthe Preliminary Hearing is very instructive in this matter. Mr.
John Beaslin, counsel for Mr, Richardson questioned Mr, James Murray on cross
examination. From the interchange it is clear that Mr. Richardson is on Parole, under the
jurisdiction/supervision of parole oflBcer James Murray. The interchange is found on pages
12,13 and 14 of the transcript of preliminary hearing held September 1, 2004 and reads as
follows;
Mr. Beaslin:
Q. Mr. Murray, based upon you conversation, as I understand it, what you did is in
Duchesne County he got a class A DUI?
A. Correct.
Q. And at that point in time you then - that became a violation of his parole?
A. Correct.
Q. So in lieu of you sending him back to prison you said why don't you join - I'll
give you 60 day Half-Way Back Program where you can to work and you'll be housed in
the Uintah County jail; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. So during this entire timefromthen until now when he was later picked up in
Salt Lake City, he is technically on Parole.
A. True.
Q. And so he can not - he has now been charged with escape. So he hasn't escaped
from anybody other than to violate probation - his parole rather. I'm sorry, parole; right?
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, wouldn't that be true? He - what he did he violated his parole when he
didn't come back on the Half-Way Back Program; right?
A. He did.
Q. So he essentially was picked up, he then now went to the prison - he went back
to prison for a violation by the Board of Pardons; right?
A. He has been there, yes.
Q. And so your jurisdiction over him terminated at that point A. Terminated when? I still have jurisdiction over him.
Q. Here in Uintah County?
A. Here in Uintah County. He's still on parole.
Q. Right. But has the Board of Pardons done anything with reference to his
violation to keep him out there?

H-

A. He's ordered him held.
Q. Okay. So he's held until this hearing?
A. He's held until we have a revocation hearing.
Q. Oh, I see. Okay. That has not been done?
A. It hasn't done because of his charge pending. Also he has a - this DUI case that
he had in Duchesne County which is falling under the Board of Pardons Jurisdiction. It is
set for hearing - it supposed to be scheduled for hearing soon too. I don't know when
though.
Q. So but you didn't violate him for that, did you? You notified them and you then
put him in the Half-Way Back Program here in Uintah County for 60 days; is that right?
A. Well, we didn't ask for revocation.
Q. That's what I mean, yeah. So you A. We still - we still prepared a report. We sent in a waiver stating he agreed to do
the program at the Uintah County Jail.
Q. I understand.
A. And as far as we're concerned he's an inmate at the county jail
Q. Okay.
A. Giving a Half-Way - you know - given work - a work release Q. Right.
A. - even though he's on parole status.
Q. Okay. So his true status so is that a parole period.
A. Well, I think he has two statuses here. I think he has a status as a county inmate
doing time pursuant to the Board of Pardons Hearing.
Q. Because he's A. He's also on parole.
Q. Yeah. So they were housing him here under that program.
A. Yes.
Q. But he didn't escapefromthe jail, did he?
A. He didn't return.
Q, I know.
A. And he was authorized -1 mean he's authorized confined at the county jail.
Q. Right.
A. He was authorized to report to work from 5 a.m. until 10 p.m. He did not
return.
Q. All right. So he violated his parole - your program that you had for him, the
Half-Way Back.
A. Yeah.
There remains no question that Mr. Richardson was on parole, that the supervising
agent was James Murray. Since there was no longer an absconding statute the escape
statue was stretched/violated to punish Mr. Richardson in contravention to the intent of
the law. His punishment for absconding was to be meted out by the Board of Pardons

r

under Utah law
THE STATE OF UTAH ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF THAT DEFENDANT
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE ARRAIGNED. DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THERE IS NO SUCH WAIVER IN THE RECORD
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that following the bind
over by the magistrate, "the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court"
In this case at preliminary hearing the defense objected to the charge of escape brought
against the defendant since as a parolee the defendant was not properly charged (Index
107 transcript of preliminary hearing pages page 3 lines 6-17) The trial court did not issue
its ruling on the issue until the day of the trial (Index 109 Trial transcript September 15,
2004, page 60 lines 13-24 {the correct date of the trial may be November 15, 2004) The
written ruling on the issue is dated November 10, 2004 (Record pages 50 and 51) The
record does not reflect that the defendant was either bound over nor arraigned at the
preliminary hearing The preliminary hearing ended with the requirement that the parties
brief the issues of escape and parole status (Record page 107 transcript of preliminary
hearing page 17 lines 12-24) There were no hearings between November 10 and trial
there is a minute entry of a hearing November 10, 2004, the minute entry reflects that Mr
Richardson was not present (Record page 52) Mr Richardson was not bound over nor
arraigned on the date of the trial either (Index 109 transcript of trial) Due process
requires that following any bind over the defendant "shall forthwith be arraigned in the
district court" (Rule 10 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) Utah Constitution Article I
section 7 provides "No person shall be deprived of Life, liberty or property without due
process of law " The defendant is to be aJBTorded an opportunity to be arraigned and plead

(o

unless he waives that opportunity. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and
State v. Jensen. 83 Utah 452, 30 P2d 203 (1934).
It is the burden of the defense to marshal the evidence in this instance to show the
negative, to show that Mr. Richardson was not arraigned. It is the absence of any record
of bind over or arraignment that is in place here. There appears in the record no bind over
order oral or written, and there is no record of arraignment or even any hearing dates
where the defendant was present, between the issuance of the written order and the
commencement of the trial 5 days later. There appears in the record no other opportunity
for an arraignment.
The failure to bind the defendant over or to arraign him is reversible error.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant herein seeks a rulingfromthis Court reversing his conviction for
Escape. Dismissing the case or remanding it for further proceedings as may be
appropriate. Such other and further relief as is just and appropriate.

Cleve Hatch/Attorney for
the Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM

Emailfrom"Legislative webmaster" "Floor and committee debates are not transcribed.
You can listen to floor debate on this bill at the web site "le.utah.gov."
S.B. 158 Criminal Offense Amendments 2004 General Session

ADDENDUM

Cleve Hatch
From;
To:
Sent:
Subject:

"Legislative Webmaster" <!egisweb@utah.gov>
<clevelaw@UBTAnet.com>
Friday, December 09,2005 8:47 AM
Re: senate bill 0158 2004 general session

Floor and committee debates are not transcribed. You can listen tofloordebate on this bill at the web
site "le.utah.gov."
Thank you for using our website.
Legislative Webmaster
> » "Cleve Hatch" <clevelaw<^UBTAnet com> 12/8/2005 9:42 AM > »
Dear Webmaster,
How do I obtain an official transcript of the reading and comments on this bill for use in an appeallate
court case.
Thank you.
Cleve Hatch
clevelaw@ubtanet com

12/26/2005

LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL
<t Approved for Filing: S.C. Allred f.
£ 01-30-04 11:58 AM 1

1

CRIMINAL OFFENSE AMENDMENTS

2

2004 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

Sponsor: Gregory S. Bell

5
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LONG TITLE

7

General Description:

8

This bill repeals the criminal provision of absconding and amends related provisions.

9

Highlighted Provisions:

10

This bill:

11

repeals the offense of absconding and amends criminal code and juvenile offender

12

provisions affected by this repealer.

13

Monies Appropriated in this Bill:

14
15

None
Other Special Clauses:

16

This bill provides an effective date.

17

Utah Code Sections Affected:

18

AMENDS:

19
20

S.B. 158

62A-7-106 (Superseded 07/01/04), as last amended by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah
2000

21

62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04), as last amended by Chapter 171, Laws of Utah 2003

22

76-8-306, as last amended by Chapter 179, Laws of Utah 2003

23
24
26
27

REPEALS:
76-8-309.5, as last amended by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 2000
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 62A-7-106 (Superseded 07/01/04) is amended to read:

uiiiiini

S.B.158
28
29

62A-7-106 (Superseded 07/01/04). Aiding or concealing youth offender Trespass - Criminal penalties.

30
31

(1) A person who commits any of the following offenses is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor:

32
33

(a) entering, or attempting to enter, a building or enclosure appropriated to the use of
youth offenders, without permission;

34
35

(b) entering any premises belonging to a secure facility and committing or attending
to commit a trespass or depredation on those premises; or

36
37

01-30-0411:58 AM

(c) willfully annoying or disturbing the peace and quiet of a secure facility or of a youth
offender in a secure facility.

38

(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who:

39

(a) knowingly haibors or conceals a youth offender who has:

40

(i) escaped from a secure facility; or

41

(ii) absconded from:

42

(A) a facility or supervision^ as these offenses arc defined in Subsections

43

76»8"309.5(l)and(2)}; or

44

(B) supervision of the Division of Youth Corrections; or

45

(b) willfully aided or assisted a youth offender who has been lawfully committed to a

46

secure facility in escaping or attempting to escape from that facility.

47

(3) As used in this section:

48

(a) a ypptfe Qffgpder afrscQRds from a facility w t o fre;

49

ft)

50

51
52

teavfrg

the facility without pgrmijappn; pr

(ii) fails to return at a prescribed time.

ft>)

A ywtfr ofifepder afrscwd? from sppgrvisipp wbgp hg;
(i) changes his residence from the residence that he reported as his correct address to

53

another residence, without notifying the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or obtaining

54

pgflnjggion; QT

55

(ii) for the purpose of avoiding supervision:

56

(A) hides at a different location from his reported residence: or

57

(B) l^vgsbi§rgpQrtg4rg§i4gnpgf

58

Section 2. Section 62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04) is amended to read:

-2-
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59
60

62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04). Aiding or concealing youth offender — Trespass Criminal penalties.

61
62

(1) A person who commits any of the following offenses is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor:

63
64

(a) entering, or attempting to enter, a building or enclosure appropriated to the use of
youth offenders, without permission;

65
66

(b) entering any premises belonging to a secure facility and committing or attempting
to commit a trespass or depredation on those premises; or

67
68

S3.158

(c) willfully annoying or disturbing the peace and quiet of a secure facility or of a youth
offender in a secure facility.

69

(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who:

70

(a) knowingly haibors or conceals a youth offender who has:

71

(i) escaped from a secure facility; or

72

(ii) absconded from:

73

<A) a facility or supervision^ as these offenses arc defined in Subsections

74

76*8-309.5(1) and (2)]; or

75

(B) supervision of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services; or

76

(b) willfully aided or assisted a youth offender who has been lawfully committed to a

77

secure facility in escaping or attempting to escape from that facility.

78

79

(3) As used in this section:

fa)

a ypptfr pffffldff atocppdsfr<?ma ftsrtfty wton he:

80

(i) leaves the facility without permission: or

81

(ii) fails to return at a prescribed time.

82

(b) A vouth offender absconds from supervision when he:

83

(i) changes his residence from the residence that he reported as his correct address to

84

another residence, without notifying the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or obtaining

85

permwiQn; <?r

86

(ii) for the purpose of avoiding supervision:

87

(A) hides at a different location from his reported residence: or

88

(B) leaygg to reported regifaare,

89

Section 3. Section 76-8-306 is amended to read:

-3-

S.B. 158
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90

76-8-306. Obstruction of justice — Elements — Penalties — Exceptions.

91

(1) An actor commits obstruction ofjustice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or

92

prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person

93

regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense:

94

(a) provides any person with a weapon;

95

(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from performing any act

96

that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any

97

person;

98

(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing;

99

(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false;

100

(e) harbors or conceals a person;

101

(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding

102

discovery or apprehension;

103

(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;

104

<h) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a

105

judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or

106
107

(i) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting
an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation.

108

(2) (a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means

109

conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this section,

110

and includes:

111
112

(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States; and

113

(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an adult

114

(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district,

115

possession, or territory of the United States, is a:

116
117
118
119
120

(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment without
parole;
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with parole
or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years;
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years;

.4-
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121

S.B. 158

(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period

122
123

exceeding one year; and
(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period of one

124

year or less.

125

(3) The penalties for obstruction of justice are:

126

(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a

127

capital felony or first degree felony;

128

(b) a third degree felony if:

129

(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree felony and

130
131

the actor violates Subsection (1 Xb), (c), (d), (e), or (f);
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a capital or

132 first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (1 )(a); or
133

(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or

134

(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated under

135
136
137
138
139

Subsection (3)(a) or (b).
(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct
constituting an offense.
(5) Subsection (l)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed
by Section 62A-7-106,

140

(6) Subsection (l)(b) does not apply to:

141

(a) tempering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508,5;

142

(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of

143

Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-508;

144

(c) tampering with a witness, which is governed by Section 76-8-508; or

145

(d) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed by Section

146
147

76-8-509.
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony

148

if the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has[: (a) absconded from a facility or from

149

supervision as those offenses axe defined in Section 76-8*309.5; or (b)] escaped from official

150

custody as defined in Section 76-8-309.

151

Section 4. Repealer.

-5-
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152

This bill repeals:

153

Section 76-8-309*5, Absconding — Definitions — Penalty.

154

Section5. Effective date.

155

(I) If approved bv two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, this bill takes

156

effect upon approval bv the governor, or the day following the constitutional time limit of Utah

157

Constitution Article VII. Section 8. without the governors signature, or in the case of a veto.

158

the date pf vgtp pvqpidfr

159

(2) Section 62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04) takes effect July L 2004.

Legislative Review Note
as of 1-29-04 11:59 AM
A limited legal review of this legislation raises no obvious constitutional or statutory concerns.
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
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